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analyse the effect on economic activity location that follows to changes on the regional 
distribution of transfers. An increase in the share of transfers a region receives positively affects 
the production of manufactures the higher are: transaction costs of goods produced under 
increasing returns to scale; the share of transfers that goes directly to consumers instead of local 
governments; the elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods; the share of consumers’ 
expenditure on manufactures via-as-vis on non-traded goods. 
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1. Introduction 
Among the different goals of national-level governments is to help easing the regional disparities in 
social and economic outcomes between sub-national regions. To this end, most federal countries 
have specific financial arrangements between the different tiers of government aimed at ensuring 
homogeneous levels of public goods provision across the regions. In most cases, these arrangements 
involve some form of tax-sharing and vertical transfers according to different criteria, but usually 
along both devolutive and redistributive bases. 
Several federal countries have designed alternative schemes for implementing these tax-sharing 
agreements. In Brazil, both regional states and municipalities receive transfers from the federal 
government.
1
 In Australia, federal transfers are critical to state budgets representing as much as 
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1 There are several different programmes but the most relevant are the Fundo de Participacao dos Estados e do Distrito 
Federal (FPE) a scheme through which the federal government allocates money to the Brazilian States in a clear 
redistributive fashion whereby the poorer northern and north-eastern States receive nearly 85% of the total fund while 
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50% of total revenues. The largest transfer is that corresponding to the proceeds of the goods and 
services tax (GST) followed by other specific transfers.
2
 Similarly, the unconditional Equalization 
Transfer in Canada accounts for more than 80% of total federal transfers to the provinces. In 
Argentina, most intergovernmental fiscal relations take place under the Régimen de Coparticipación 
Impositiva which introduces criteria for vertical and horizontal distribution of funds.
3
 Even non-
federal countries often have some form of financial arrangements between the central and local 
governments. One recent example is the significant changes in intergovernmental relations in China 
introduced in 1994 when the Chinese government engineered the Tax-Sharing System (TSS) reform 
aimed at improving the efficiency of sub-national spending and reducing horizontal inequalities.
4
  
While this topic has often attracted the attention of scholars, it has only in recent years become 
more actively researched due to several reasons. Firstly, the fact that several countries have moved 
towards more federal forms of government in the last 30 years has prompted scholars to analyze 
these and other related topics in more detail. Additionally, the growing importance of regions as 
clusters of economic activity has also highlighted the relevance of inter-governmental financial 
relations. Finally, although only a small number of countries are federally organized by law, they 
use up around half of the earth’s surface area and their citizens make up more than 40% of the 
world’s population.5 Furthermore, a large part of the literature is focused on studying the economic 
and political determinants of federal transfers while the strand that focuses on the economic and 
social effects of transfers has been given less attention. Our paper contributes to this latter literature 
                                                                                                                                                            
the rest goes out to the richer, southern States. Additionally, there is also the Fundo de Participacao dos Municipios 
(FPM) which accounts for as much as 40% of total municipal revenues, and it is also structured on redistributive criteria. 
2 There are two central types of transfers to the states and territories; the General Purpose Payments (GPP), which 
consist of automatic untied transfers and the Specific Purpose Payments (SPP), which consist of earmarked funds for 
specific areas such as health, education, transport and housing. 
3 Although the current implementation of the Régimen de Coparticipación Impositiva was agreed in 1988, the tax-
sharing agreements and transfers between the federal government and the provinces have existed for almost 80 years. 
4 After the 1994 reform, taxes are classified in three categories: central, local and shared taxes between the central and 
local governments. Alongside with two separate tax administration systems, the government created a third scheme by 
establishing the tax rebate system and the equalization transfer system based on the relation between fiscal capability 
and expenditure needs of local governments. The Chinese TSS reform is explained in more detail in Zhang and 
Martinez-Vazquez (2003). 
5 This recent interest on the effects of inter-governmental transfers has also been fuelled by the experiences of some of 
the most heavily populated countries which, are either federal by law (India and the Russian Federation) or share some 
trademark federalist traits. 
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by means of investigating the role of federal untied transfers in regional convergence, particularly 
the regional distribution of footloose production. 
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we discuss briefly the literature on the effects of 
capital flows, foreign aid and the Dutch disease. In section 3 we present some casual evidence on 
the relationship between the distribution of federal transfers and manufacturing production. In 
section 4 we develop a simple and parsimonious model inspired on the New Economic Geography 
literature. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Capital flows, foreign aid, and the Dutch disease 
The neoclassical theory, under its usual set of assumptions, predicts that in response to a difference 
in the rates of return there should be a net flow of capital from richer to poorer countries, such that 
the later would grow faster producing a convergence in per capita income between these two groups 
of countries. However there is plenty of evidence where observed outcomes are not in line with the 
theoretical predictions. Almost twenty years ago an influential neoclassical author like Robert 
Lucas
6
 pointed out that the direction of capital flows were quite different from those suggested by 
the theory. A paradox that appears to have become stronger as time (and globalisation) moves 
forward. Even more striking is the fact that capital appears to flow in the direction from poor 
countries to rich ones. 
These findings have led some authors to suggest for the need of government intervention. The 
question that then arises is what could be the effects of capital inflows on less developed regions? 
The answers are not homogeneous, and even contradictory. On the one hand, we have works such 
as Clemens et al. (2004) pointing out that capital flows are beneficial for poorer regions; on the 
other hand works such that of Rajan and Subramanian (2008) point out to a potentially negative 
effect derived from capital inflows. All these contributions deal with the issue of international 
capital mobility. To the best of our knowledge there has been no attempt to study the phenomenon 
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at the sub-national level
7
. Because of this, most of the literature we rely on refers to the problem 
from an international perspective. 
To some extent, but with the required qualifications, the debate resembles the controversy between 
J. M. Keynes and Bertil Ohlin regarding the transfers required to fulfil the payments imposed on 
Germany after its defeat in the First World War. This controversy centred around the effects that 
such transfers would produce both on the recipient countries but mostly on Germany, the “donor”. 
However, the debate then was kept under a static framework. Currently, the debate incorporates a 
dynamic dimension to this problem by looking at the effects that such transfers could have on the 
structure of production of countries that benefit from a positive net capital flow, and how this could 
affect the achievement of what we may call as the new “El Dorado” or, in more technical terms, 
sustainable growth.  
There exists evidence that supports the idea that, under some circumstances, the aid received by less 
developed regions may end up becoming an iron life vest. In the early fifties, Samuelson (1952) 
analysed the problem under a macro framework assuming a two-country Walrasian model, 
concluding that the transfer paradox was not logically viable. Later, other studies relaxed some of 
Samuelson’s assumptions and suggested that the transfer paradox was indeed a possible outcome 
under a Walrasian model if: a) there were more than two countries (Gale, 1974, Chichilnisky, 1980); 
b) a general equilibrium trade model is used (Bhagwati et al., 1983; Yano, 1983); and c) free trade 
was absent (Brecher and Bhagwati, 1982). Hirschman (1958) also suggested the transfer paradox 
could work through changes in relative prices, with foreign aid increasing the relative price of non-
tradable goods because of the expansion of domestic demand. 
The empirical evidence is scarce and limited to the case of international transfers. Yano and Nugent 
(1999) address the problem using a small economy model which receives exogenous foreign aid 
and is unable to affect its terms of trade. The model also assumes capital and labour are 
domestically mobile across sectors but not internationally. There are three goods, one non-tradable 
                                               
7  There are some references in the literature that recognize this point without going into a detailed study of this 
phenomenon. See for example Torvik (2002).  
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and two goods that are internationally traded. The authors distinguish between two potential effects: 
a) an import substitution effect; and b) a domestic good effect. While the authors find that the 
import substitution effect is absent in most of the 44 countries included into their sample, the 
domestic good effect shows a negative contribution to growth, offsetting, at least partially, the 
direct positive effects from foreign aid. 
Rajan and Subramanian (2008) provide more conclusive evidence in their examination of the 
effects of international capital flows on the process of development. More specifically, they look at 
if less developed countries that experienced a faster growth were also the most dependants on 
foreign savings. The outcome the authors arrive to suggests countries that have resorted to less 
foreign financing have grown faster. They conclude that the dependency on foreign capital may 
produce a perverse outcome through the appreciation of the local currency, that if large enough may 
produce a Dutch disease like phenomenon, affecting negatively the competitiveness of sectors that 
are crucial if a sustainable growth is to be achieved, such as is the case of manufacturing production. 
Similarly, in a recent survey paper, Doucouliagos and Paldam (2009) conclude that foreign aid has 
been largely ineffective in fostering economic growth and that one plausible explanation for this 
result is the Dutch disease effect on the exchange rates of the countries on the recipient end.  
Up to now, we have limited our discussion to the Dutch disease problem in its standard context, that 
of international transfers. Within our framework, the Dutch disease is the phenomenon with 
negative consequences that may follow after an (important) increase in foreign capital inflows. The 
increase in foreign capital flows produces an increase in the demand of both tradable and non-
tradable goods. The higher demand for tradable goods could be met by an increase in imports and a 
reduction of exports, which would also help to counteract the appreciation of the local currency that 
follows after the initial flow of foreign capital. However, if the possibility of satisfying the 
increasing demand for the non-tradable goods is restricted by rigidities on the supply side, this 
would provoke a further appreciation of the local currency, and therefore hurting in the short-run 
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the international competitiveness of domestic producers; even the long-run competitiveness may 
also be affected if the economy is less attractive to local and foreign investors. 
If the nominal exchange rate is fixed, the increase in foreign capital inflows would lead to an 
increase in the supply of the domestic currency, resulting in an increase in domestic prices, which is 
equivalent to an appreciation of the local currency through a reduction in the nominal exchange rate. 
In the case of a country, it is possible to counterbalance the negative effects of an increase in 
foreign capital inflows through restrictive fiscal and/or monetary policies. This alternative is of 
course absent in the case of regions which belong to a single economy, since they share the same 
currency. Thus, the recommendation to compensate for the negative effects of an increase in 
transfers is to achieve a higher productivity and to increase the capacity to produce non-tradable 
goods, which would help to reduce the pressure on the relative price of these goods. 
 
3. Vertical fiscal transfers and the regional location of manufactures: some 
evidence for selected federal countries 
In this section we look at some evidence on the relationship between federal transfers and regional 
manufacturing production. We have collected data for six federal countries: Argentina, Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, Mexico and Spain.
8
 The main variables are all in per capita terms and have been 
standardized to allow for easier comparison
9
. For each country, we consider the most significant 
transfer component which usually corresponds to some concept of current (automatic) transfers
10
. 
The following figures show a side-by-side view of the standardized regional transfers per capita and 
                                               
8 We have time series data on transfers and regional GDP for all countries and data on industry GDP for all countries 
but Argentina. In all cases our goal was to maximize the length of the time series to infer long-run behavior at the cost 
of using periods with different lengths. Data for Argentina goes from 1962 to 2001, Australia from 2000 to 2010, Brazil 
from 1995 to 2009, Canada from 1999 to 2008, Mexico from 1994 to 2010, and Spain from 1995 to 2009. Since for 
most countries the time period for which data were available was not very long, we are not able in this section to 
speculate on the long term relationship between the variables.  
9 Since both series are standardized, the diagrams for the two periods are not directly comparable in absolute values –i.e. 
a higher value of a region's transfers per capita may have associated a lower standardized value if the mean of the 
distribution grows over time and thus have a darker shade in a diagram- although they provide an insight of the relative 
position of a region in terms of both regional transfers and GDP.  
10 This is not always straightforward since all the countries have different tax-sharing schemes and the number and type 
of transfers vary significantly across the different federations. Whenever possible, we decided to use the most relevant 
transfer fund in each category. If it was not possible to determine whether a specific transfer fund was automatic or non-
automatic, we excluded it from our data analysis.  
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GDP per capita in both the start and end year in our sample for each country (darker shades 
correspond to higher levels of the corresponding variable). See Table 1 for a description of variables 
and sources. 
All the figures contain two graphs each depicting information on federal transfers to regional 
governments (left panel) and regional manufacturing GDP (right panel) on different years. The 
information contained in each graph provides a basic overview of the relationship between transfers 
and regional manufacturing production. Looking at each graph it is evident that, with only a few 
exceptions
11
, regions with higher amount of per capita transfers are also those which have the 
lowest industrial GDP per capita (i.e. regions with darker shades on the left panel are associated 
with lighter shades on the right panel and vice versa). However, this evidence could be biased if 
there were economy-wide shocks -or worse, region-specific shocks- on the years chosen for a 
particular country/region
12
. In order to limit this potential limitation, we decided to plot both 
variables in the start and end year for each country. In doing so, we are able to look at these 
diagrams at two different points in time and gain some insights about how the relationship between 
transfers and manufacturing GDP evolves over time.  
Looking at the diagrams for each country, it becomes evident that no clear pattern emerges. There 
are some countries where regions which receive larger amounts of per capita transfers than a few 
decades ago have actually worsened their position relatively to the sample mean in the recent 
period
13
. Argentina and Mexico show a similar pattern with the positions of the different regions 
being relatively stable over the selected period of time and in some cases a worsening in the relative 
position. In Argentina, provinces like Chaco (CHA), Santiago (SGO), Formosa (FOR) and Tierra 
del Fuego (TDF) have all improved their relative transfer position during the forty year period 
ranging from 1962 to 2001 yet their position with respect to regional GDP has not improved relative 
                                               
11 The most notable exceptions are the regions of Cantabria and La Rioja in Spain, Campeche in Mexico, Tasmania in 
Australia, and the provinces of Santa Cruz and Tierra del Fuego in Argentina.  
12 As we noted before, we are not afforded a great deal of flexibility to choose from different years since in most cases 
data were not available for both variables for a long period of time.  
13
 Recall that these are standardized numbers so the amount each region receives is adjusted by the mean and standard 
deviation of the corresponding year. This means that when looking at the standings of specific regions in recent years, 
we emphasize the evolution of these variables relative to the other regions rather than in absolute terms.  
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to the regional average and has actually worsened for Chaco (CHA) and Tierra del Fuego (TDF)
14
. 
Similarly, provinces whose transfer position has not changed [Rio Negro (RNG), Chubut (CHU), 
Santa Fe (SFE) and La Pampa (LPA)] or worsened [Neuquén (NQN), Mendoza (MZA), and Santa 
Cruz (SCR)] have kept or improved their relative production position over the same period. It is 
important to note that in the case of the provinces in the Patagonia region [Neuquén (NQN), Río 
Negro (RNG), Chubut (CHU), Santa Cruz (SCR) and Tierra del Fuego (TDF)] a large fraction of 
their incomes comes from oil and gas royalties, specially at the end of the period.  
In Mexico, there have not been significant changes in the transfer position of the different regions in 
the period 1994-2010. It is worth noting, however, that several regions [Hidalgo (HI), Tabasco (TA), 
Baja California Norte (BS) and Sonora (SO)] have actually worsened their transfer position without 
significant changes in their relative manufacturing position. Most of the other regions have 
maintained their relative position in relation with transfers per capita but only a few have 
experienced changes in their relative manufacturing position. These are the cases of Chihuahua (CI), 
Cohauila (CO) and Nuevo León (NL) which have worsened their relative manufacturing position. 
The Campeche (CA) region, despite having maintained a similar transfer position has gone from 
below-average industrial GDP to the highest manufacturing GDP per capita of all the regions in this 
period. One likely explanation for this is that the share of industrial GDP in total GDP in Campeche 
(CA) has grown to represent almost 85% mainly due to the extraordinary growth of oil production 
in the state since the late 90's
15
. 
In the case of Brazil, there have not been significant changes in how transfers were redistributed 
between 1995 and 2009, with most of the States keeping their relative positions; the most any State 
changed is two places. However, despite the stability in the distribution of transfers it is possible to 
observe some important changes in the case of manufacturing GDP, with only 8 out of 27 States 
                                               
14 It is important to note that Tierra del Fuego (TDF) is a special case since both population and the amount of automatic 
transfers have increased significantly over this period; population experienced a ten-fold increase while the proportion 
of the Co-participación fund that goes to the province has experienced a significant increase due to the special regime 
that applies to the region.  
15 Oil production in Campeche (CA) as a proportion of total oil production in the country grew from 36% in the 80's, to 
almost 60% in the 2000-2008 period. Additionally, Campeche has one of the lowest rates of population growth among 
the Mexican states.  
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maintaining their position unchanged, while the rest have either worsened [Roraima (RR) 11 
positions, Amapá (AP) 7 positions, Sergipe (SE) 6 positions, and Pará (PA) 4 positions] or 
improved [Bahia (BA) 7 positions, Rondônia (RO) 6 positions, Distrito Federal (DF) and Paraíba 
(PB) 5 positions, and Ceará (CE) 4 positions] up to eleven positions. Moreover, only in two cases, 
Ceará (CE) and Piauí (PI), the relative positions in terms of transfers and GDP moved in the same 
direction, with both States improving on the two dimensions. This results suggest that we may need 
to look elsewhere than changes in transfers to explain changes in the industry GDP per capita.  
The other three federal countries we have gathered data for are, unlike the first three, developed 
economies. While federal transfers do not appear to worsen the position of regional manufacturing 
production over time, they do not seem to have a positive impact which tends to perpetuate regional 
inequalities in terms of manufacturing production. This is clearly the case of Spain where the 
regions that have improved their transfer position [Madrid (MA) and Cantabria (CN)] have actually 
maintained (or worsened) their relative manufacturing position. Still, the changes in both transfers 
per capita and regional manufacturing GDP are less marked than in the previous countries
16
. Even 
less dramatic is the case of the Australian Federation. In this case, there seems to be much greater 
stability on the transfer and manufacturing position of the Australian regions. This may be due to 
the way transfers are allocated in Australia, Equalization Transfers to close the sub-national fiscal 
gap, or due to the fact that we have a very short time period which prevents us from observing 
dramatic changes in either variable. In any case, it is very likely that the evidence that regional 
differences at the outset in manufacturing are much less striking than in Argentina, Mexico and 
Spain explains this stability.  
                                               
16 Here we use the transfers corresponding to the Tributos Cedidos which are taxes whose collection the Spanish state 
bestow upon the autonomous communities. Some of these are given entirely to the autonomous communities and in 
other cases a given percent it's assigned to the autonomous communities. The regime of inter-jurisdictional 
arrangements was changed in 2009 with the Sistema de Financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas de Régimen 
Común. Since it was unclear whether these transfers or the transfers corresponding to the Fondo de Suficiencia 
(transfers from the central government to the regional communities to compensate for horizontal inequalities) were most 
appropriate to capture a concept of automatic transfers, we also produced diagrams using the latter. Due to space 
limitations we do not include those graphs here but are available from the authors upon request. In fact, these maps 
show more clearly the lack of relationship between transfers per capita and manufacturing GDP.  
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Finally, the situation in Canada appears slightly different from the Australian case and significantly 
different from the other countries. Despite the short time period, there is some evidence that regions 
which have improved their transfer position over time have also improved their relative 
manufacturing position, such is the case of the provinces of Manitoba (MAN) and Nunavut (NVT), 
while Ontario (ONT) has seen a relative deterioration in terms of GDP. Most of the other Canadian 
provinces preserve both their transfer and manufacturing position over this period; in fact, if 
anything it would seem that transfers per capita and regional manufacturing GDP move in the same 
direction as is the case for the provinces of Alberta (ALB), Saskatchewan (SAS) and Manitoba 
(MAN) and also for Quebec (QUE) and Newfoundland and Labrador (NL).  
While these figures are intuitively enough to grasp the idea that a change in the relative position of 
transfers per capita may have diverse effects, or none at all, for the different countries, they do not 
provide conclusive evidence of the relationship between transfers and manufacturing production. In 
fact, the evidence presented so far suggests that there is significant heterogeneity in the relationship 
between unconditional federal transfers to regional governments and their manufacturing GDP. In 
order to provide a bit more rigorous analysis, we now estimate a standard cross-section convergence 
equation, where the dependant variable is the simple average of annual growth rates of regional 
(provincial) manufacturing GDP per capita. As explanatory variables, we include the level of  
regional (provincial) manufacturing GDP per capita at the beginning of the period, and the simple 
average of annual growth rates of federal transfers received by regional (provincial) governments. 
In three cases, Argentina, Brazil and Canada, there is evidence of conditional convergence, while 
for Australia the opposite result arises. With regards the role of transfers, only for Brazil they show 
a positive and statistical significant effect on GDP growth, while for Australia they appear to have 
shown a negative impact on convergence of manufacturing production. For the remaining four 
countries the estimated coefficients are not statistical significant. 
In Table 3 we present some additional quantitative evidence. Here we use all available information 
to estimate a panel-data convergence equation. Now the dependant variable is annual growth rate of 
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regional (provincial) manufacturing GDP per capita. As explanatory variables, we include the 
lagged level of regional (provincial) manufacturing GDP per capita and the annual growth rate of 
federal transfers received by regional (provincial) governments. For all countries but Canada, there 
is evidence of conditional convergence, however the values of the estimated coefficients are almost 
equal to zero. As in the cross-section case, in Brazil there appears to be a positive effects of 
transfers on the growth rate of manufacturing value added. The same result also emerges for 
Argentina and Canada but the estimates are much lower than in the Brazilian case, specially for the 
Argentina. Also, let us remember that for Argentina we are using total GDP instead of that of the 
manufacturing sector. 
The simplicity of our specifications call for caution on the interpretation of the results. For instance 
the short time period we have data for. Moreover, due to the lack of the necessary data, we cannot 
explore for the possibility of a reverse causality, since it may be the case that the way in which 
transfers are distributed among the different regions are a function of how production is distributed 
regionally, and not the other way around. However, this last issue may lack some relevance, since 
with the exception for Argentina, we are using industrial GDP, and assuming that if transfers are 
endogenous, they would respond more to total GDP differences than to differences in industrial 
GDP. Despite of these concerns, if something  emerges clearly is that there seems to be sufficient 
heterogeneity in the relationship between federal transfers and regional manufacturing GDP among 
the selected countries.  
In the next section we present a simple theoretical model to try to shed some light on our findings, 
specially the absence of a clear relationship between our two variables of interest. 
 
4. The model 
As the casual evidence presented in the previous section shows, there appears to be no clear 
relationship between unconditional vertical transfers and the distribution of manufacturing 
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production. If something emerges from the data is the heterogeneity across the six countries we 
gathered data for, as well as within some of the countries themselves. 
To try to shed some light on the empirical evidence just summarized in the previous section, we 
now develop a simple model to try to explain why a priori could be not possible to establish a clear 
relationship between the two variables that we are interested in, becoming an empirical matter what 
relationship, if any, there exists between them. 
With this purpose, we extend Martin and Rogers (1995) Footloose Capital Model (FCM) to analyse 
how changes in the distribution of transfers from the Federal to State governments affect the 
regional location of manufacturing production. We extend the FCM by including in each region a 
sector that produces a non-traded good and a local government which uses public resources to hire 
public employment. 
Firstly we will present the full model, and then when we look at the effects of transfers on the 
location of manufacturing production, we will work with two alternative cases, depending on the 
number of sectors we consider. The full model includes four sectors, agriculture, manufactures, and 
a non-traded sector in each of the two regions the country is divided in. Both, the agricultural good 
and the non-traded goods are produced under constant returns to scale (CRS) using only labour (L). 
The production of manufactures presents increasing returns to scale (IRS), and involves the use of 
capital (K) as a fixed cost, and labour (L) as a variable cost. The market for manufactures is 
organised as a monopolistically competitive market à la Dixit-Stiglitz, where each firm in the 
market produces a differentiated variety. Trade of manufactures between the two regions is subject 
to positive transport costs, which take the well-known Samuelson’s iceberg type. The markets for 
the agricultural good as well as those of the non-traded goods are perfectly competitive. Trade of 
the agricultural good between the two regions is costless. By definition, each non-traded good is 
sold only in the region it is produced. We assume also that labour is perfectly mobile between 
sectors but immobile between regions, capital, instead, is mobile between regions. There are also 
two levels of governments, a national government and two local governments. The national 
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government, which we do not model explicitly taxes all capital revenues
17
 and transfers them to the 
two regions. These transfers can go either to the local governments or be received directly by 
consumers. Local governments use all transfers they receive to hire employees
18
; this assumption 
may seem a bit extreme, but it is done in order to prevent for the public sector to have a role on the 
relative demand for different goods. Consumers get no utility from public employment.. 
 
Consumers 
Consumers in each region have a two-tier utility function. The first tier takes a Cobb-Douglas form, 
and is defined over the consumption of the agricultural good, the non-traded good and a composite 
of manufactures. More specifically, the utility function for the representative consumer living in 
region i can be stated as follows:  
     
  
     , , ,            with 1
A NT M
i A i NT i M i A NT Mu c c c  
where cA,i is the per-capita consumption of the agricultural good, cNT,i is the per-capita consumption 
of the non-traded good produced in region i, and cM,i is the per-capita consumption of the composite 
of manufactures. A, NT and M are the expenditure shares the consumer spends on the 
consumption of each good. 
The cM,i composite takes the following CES form: 
 



 
   
 

1
,         0 1M i i
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c c h  
where ci(h) is the units consumed of any given variety h, and N=n1+n2 is the total number of 
manufacture varieties, n1 and n2 are the number of varieties produced in regions 1 and 2 
respectively. From the consumer maximisation problem we have that the consumption of each 
manufactured variety by all consumers living in region i is equal to: 
                                               
17 This assumption is made based on the literature on public finance which suggests it is more efficient for a Federal 
government, instead of state level governments, to tax footloose activities or factors that are potentially mobile across 
regions. 
18 Public employment can be also interpreted as a kind of non-traded good. 
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where j
ipT  is the consumer price of a variety consumed in region i and produced in region j, PMi is 
the manufacture price index in region i, Ei is the total income
19
 of consumers living in region i, and 
 is the elasticity of substitution between manufactured varieties20. The assumption that trade of 
manufactures is subject to iceberg-type costs means the following relationships between consumer 
and producer prices: 
        if  
      if  
j j
i
j j
i
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pT pT i j
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where>1 are iceberg transport costs, and pTi and pTj are the producer prices in regions i and j 
respectively. The notion of iceberg transport costs means that for one unit of the good consumed in 
region i,  units need to be shipped from j. 
Total consumption of the other two goods are equal to: 

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Producers 
As stated above, production of the agricultural good and the two non-trade goods are subject to 
constant returns to scale, and uses only labour. More specifically, we assume the following 
production functions: 
i i
i i
A LA
NT LNT


 
                                               
19 Since there is no saving in the model, income is equal to expenditure. 
20 For N large enough,  is also the price elasticity of demand of each variety. 
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where LAi and LNTi are the units of labour used in the production of agriculture and the non-traded 
sector in region i. From the producer problems for each of the two sectors, the prices of the 
agricultural and non-traded goods are: 
i i ipA pNT w   
where wi is the wage rate in region i. The assumption that the agricultural good has no transport cost 
between regions means that, if there is a positive production of it in both regions, in equilibrium we 
have wi=wj=w. This is not necessarily the case when we consider an economy with no agricultural 
sector. 
In the case of the production of manufactures, this uses capital and labour. The total cost of any 
given variety produced in region i is given by: 
 i i i iCT F a w x   
where F is the requirement of capital, which does not depend on the scale of production xi, a is the 
requirement of labour for each unit of production, and i is the rate of return for capital. 
From the profit maximisation problem we obtain that the producer price in region i is: 
1
i
ipT a w




 
Additionally, the assumption of free entry and exit of firms means that in equilibrium firms obtain 
zero profits  0i i i i ipT x aw x F   , such that the scale of production of each manufacture 
variety produced in region i is equal to: 
 1i
i
i
F
x
aw
  
  
By choice of units we can assume 
1
a



  and F=1, such that we get: 
i
ipT w  
i
i
i
x
w
 
  
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The assumption that there is no trade cost for the agricultural good means that producer prices are 
the same in both regions, i jpT pT . 
 
Capital rent and total income 
Under Dixit-Stiglitz competition in the manufacturing sector, the rent of capital, also called 
operating profits, is a proportion of total sales (at the producer price):      ii ipT x F .  
Total income is the sum of labour income plus the revenue from capital rent. As we assumed before, 
capital is mobile between regions, however capital owners remain always at the same location. In 
the absence of a national government that captures all capital income through taxes, we assume that 
independently where capital is used each unit is evenly owned between the populations of the two 
regions. Then, if L1=L2, residents in each region receive half of total operating profits, which are 
equal to: ME
W
/F, where EW is total income, that under the assumption that there is no savings is 
equal to labor income plus operating profits:         W Wi i j j ME w L w L E F . Solving for EW 
we get: 
  
 



i i j jW
M
w L w L F
E
F
21
 
Now, let us assume that there exist a national government that taxes all capital income, and 
redistribute it between the two regions, with a proportion 0 1ie   going to region i, and a 
proportion  0 1 1ie    going to region j. Additionally, a proportion 0 1   of these transfers 
go directly to consumers, while the remaining percentage  0 1 1    goes to local governments, 
which use these transfers to finance public employment. Under these assumptions capital rent going 
to all consumers is equal to ME
W
/F, such that world income is: 
  
  



i i j jW
M
w L w L F
E
F
 
                                               
21 From the expression for EW we need F>M for the model have a solution. 
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From all the above we have that total incomes in regions i and j are: 
 






 
  1
W
M
i i i i
W
M
j j j i
E
E w L e
F
E
E w L e
F
 
 
Equilibrium conditions 
In each market the equilibrium condition is given by the equality between demand and supply, in 
particular we have: 
- Agriculture 
W
A
i j
E
LA LA
pA

   
When the agriculture sector is included we assume that both regions have a positive production of 
good A, meaning that both LAi and LAj are positive. This assumption is guaranteed if total spending 
on the agricultural good, namely AE
W
, is greater than the maximum value of the agriculture 
production by either region, namely pA(max{Li,Lj}). This assumption guaranties that wi=wj=w.  
- Non-traded goods 
 
 
 
 
NT i
i
i
NT j
j
j
E
LNT
pNT
E
LNT
pNT




 
- Local government budgets 
As stated above, the national government, which we do not model here explicitly, taxes all capital 
revenue, and redistributes it between the two regions, in a proportion ei for region i and  1 ie  for 
region j. From these transfers only a proportion (1-) goes to the local governments, which use 
these transfers to hire labour. Remembering that total operating profits are equal to  WME F , 
government budgets are in equilibrium when: 
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 
 

 




(1- )
  
1 (1- )
  
W
i M
i i
W
i M
j j
e E
LGw
F
e E
LG w
F
 
where LGi and LGj are the numbers of public employees in regions i and j. 
- Manufactures 
The equilibrium condition for each manufacture variety produced in region i is given by: 
 
 
 
 
1 1
i i
i M i M j
i j
pT pT
x E E
PM PM
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
where the first and second terms on the right hand side are, respectively, the total demand, including 
the quantity that melts in transit, by consumers of regions i and j of each variety produced in region 
i. A similar condition holds for region j: 
 
 
 
 
1 1
j j
j M i M j
i j
pT pT
x E E
PM PM
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
In the two conditions above PMi and PMj are the manufactured price indices which are equal to: 
   
1
1 1 1i j
i i jPM n pT n pT
  

    
  
 
   
1
1 1 1i j
j i jPM n pT n pT
  

    
  
 
Choosing units such that F=1, the number of varieties ni and nj are equal to the stock of capital in 
each region Ki and Kj. If the country stock of capital is normalised to 1 we have ni=ki and nj=(1-ki), 
where ki is the share of capital located in region i. Additionally, if 
1
a



  the price indices 
reduce to: 
     
1
11 1
1i i i i jPM k w k w
 

 
    
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     
1
11 1
1j i i i jPM k w k w
 

 
    
Furthermore, in the case there is an agriculture sector such that wages equalise across regions, and 
using the wage rate as numeraire (w=1) we obtain: 
  
1
1 11i i iPM k k
       
  
1
1 11j i iPM k k
       
- Regional labour markets 
i i i i i
j j j j j
L LA LM LNT LG
L LA LM LNT LG
   
   
 
where labour demands by the manufacturing sectors are  i i iLM nax and  j j jLM n ax . 
 
4.1 Transfers and the long run equilibrium 
We now analyse the distribution of manufacture production as a response to changes in the 
distribution of transfers from the national government. We divide the analysis in two cases. Firstly, 
we consider an economy where all sectors are present. Secondly, we consider a model with no 
agricultural sector. 
 
Case 1: a model with agriculture, manufactures, non-traded goods and local governments 
The existence of the agricultural sector, together with the assumption of positive productions in 
both regions, namely that total spending on the agricultural good (AE
W
) is greater than the 
maximum value of the agriculture production by either region (pA(max{Li,Lj})), means that wages 
are equalised across the two regions (wi=wj=w).  
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As pointed out before, operating profits are a proportion of total sales: i=pT
i
xi /F. If units are 
appropriately chosen such that: a=(-1)/, F=1, K=1, Li+Lj=1, and the wage rate is the numeraire 
(w=1), for a given distribution of capital, operating profits reduce to: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
1 1
1
1 1
1
1 1
1
1 1
W
ii M
i
i i i i
W
ii M
j
i i i i
E
k k k k
E
k k k k

 

 
  

  
  

  

 

 
 
  
     
 
  
     
 
where 
1
M M
i Lis e
   
 
 

   is the share of region i in total income EW, 1
1 2
Li
L
s
L L


 is the 
share of region i in total population, and total income is equal to W
M
E

  


. 
If transfers from the national government are received only by the local governments (=0), region 
i’s share in total income becomes equal its participation in total population  i Lis  , and total 
income reduces to E
W
=1. Then we have: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
1 1
1
1 1
1
1 1
1
1 1
LiLi M
i
i i i i
LiLi M
j
i i i i
ss
k k k k
ss
k k k k

 

 
 

  
 

  

 

 
 
  
     
 
  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 

  
  

 
 
    
     
1
1 1
1
1
1 1
LiLi M
i j
i i i i
ss
k k k k
 
When =0 we have from the equilibrium conditions that traded and no-traded markets are not 
affected, directly nor indirectly, by changes in how transfers are distributed between the two regions. 
In the case of the budget government conditions, changes in ei allow the government which receives 
larger (lower) transfers to hire more (less) people. Then, to labour markets to clear the region where 
public employment increases (decreases) the number of people employed in the agricultural sectors 
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must fall (rise). Employment levels in the non-traded sectors and in manufactures remain 
unchanged. 
As we can observe, when =0 operating profits do not depend, directly nor indirectly, on how the 
national government distribute the transfers between the two regions: 0
ji
i ie e
 
 
 
.  
Moreover, the distribution of capital in the log run, that is the one for which i - j = 0 depends only 
on the distribution of population. Solving for ki we get: 
 
1
1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1
0
1
1 1
1 1 1
1
1
1


  
  



  
  



  
  


 

  
  
  

 

            if   
     if   
             if   
Li
Li
i Li
Li
s
s
k s
s
 
Thus, for a non core-periphery equilibrium we have ki is an increasing function of sLi, the share of 
region i in the population, with 
1
1
1
1
1
i
Li
k
s






 
 
 
. 
As Figure 8 shows, if regions are symmetric, when sLi=1/2, the optimum distribution of capital is 
also symmetric: ki=1/2. 
A different scenario emerges when  > 0. From the expressions for i and j, changes in the way 
transfers are distributed, namely changes in ei, affect i and j through changes in i. Remembering 
that 
   
 
 

  1
M M
i Lis e , and increase in ei increases i. Then, if we were in a long run 
equilibrium situation, as ei changes the economy moves out of the equilibrium such that it is 
necessary a different distribution of the capital stock to re-establish the equilibrium. The direction 
of the change in ki required to achieve a new long run equilibrium depends on how i and j reacts 
to changes in i and ki.  
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From the equilibrium conditions for the non-traded goods and the local government budgets
22
 it can 
be show that 0i
i
LNT
e



, 0i
i
LG
e



, 0
j
i
LNT
e



 and 0
j
i
LG
e



, such that an increase in the 
transfers received by region i increases employment in the public and the non-traded sectors. 
Subtracting j from i we have: 
 
 
 
  
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  
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W
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k k k k
 
Then, for the long run  0i j    we can derive the expression for ki as a function of the 
parameters of the model: 
 
1
1
1 1 1
1 1 1
1
0
1
1 1
1 1 1
1
1
1
            if   
     if   
             if   
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i
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  
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 

 
Thus, for a non core-periphery equilibrium we have ki is an increasing function of ei (trough change 
in i), the share of transfers received by region i (see Figure 9), with 
1
1
1
0
1
i M
i
k
e


 
 


 
 
 
. 
Additionally, the rate at which ki changes increases with , the share of transfers that goes directly 
to consumers (see Figure 10). The reason for this outcome is that as  increases, the larger 
is i ie  , such that for a given distribution of K, a given change in ei produces a larger change in 
i j  , so the change in ki required to achieve a new long run equilibrium, namely i j  , is also 
larger. 
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j
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e
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 
  
 


. 
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 Finally, 0i
i
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de
  means 0i
i
dLT
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  and 0
j
i
dLT
de

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, such that together with 0i
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, we need 0i
i
dLA
de
  and 0
j
i
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de
  in order to labour markets to clear in 
each region. 
The reason for these different outcomes, depending on 0 or 0   , is explained because in the 
first case, independently of how the national government distributes transfers between the two 
regions, total incomes in each region remain constant. This means that there is no incentive for 
firms to change location and move from the region transfers are taken away to the region which 
receives larger transfers. On the other hand, when 0   regions’ income shares are a positive 
function of the proportion of transfers received. Then, as ei increases region i’s market increases 
relative to the one of region j, such that operating profits increase in region i and decrease in region 
j. In response to this, firms find profitable to move from region j to region i. As firms move from 
region i to region j, operating profits falls in region i and increase in region j, this continues until 
operating profits equalise once again in both regions.  
 
Case 2: a model without agricultural sector 
The existence of a positive production in both regions by the agricultural sector guaranties that 
wi=wj=w. As we saw above this feature simplifies greatly the model, but at the cost of having a 
positive and monotonic relationship between the distributions of manufactures and fiscal transfers 
across regions. This is not necessarily the case when the agricultural sector is excluded, such that 
only in some very special occasions, the completely symmetric case, wage rates in both regions will 
be identical.  
                                               
23 Le us remember that the scale of production is a positive function of operating profits and that 0i
ie



 and 
0
j
ie



. 
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Using the same normalisations as above, namely F=1, K=1, Li+Lj=1, a=(-1)/, and choosing the 
wage rate in region i as numeraire (wi =1), operating profits reduce to: 
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where 
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the share of region i in total population, and total income is equal to 
  

  
  

1W Li Li j
M
E s s w . 
Now changes in the way transfers are distributed between the two regions will have an effect on 
wage rates affecting also capital rewards. On the other hand, the distribution of capital affects the 
equilibrium wage rates. This feature of the model introduces as it happens in Krugman's Core-
Periphery model a circularity which makes not possible to achieve closed form solutions.
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 Because 
of this new feature of the model, the analysis in this section is based solely on numerical 
simulations. 
The behaviour of the model when the agricultural sector is excluded depends on the values taken by 
four parameters. Two of these parameters depend on consumers’ preferences, the distribution of 
expenditure between manufactures and the non-traded good (M), and the elasticity of substitution 
(). The other two parameters are to some extent policy choices; one is the share of transfers that go 
directly to consumers (), while the other is transaction costs () which can be affected by the 
public sector (i.e. through infrastructure investment). 
                                               
24 In Krugman (1991) model the circularity arises because consumers migrate in response to differences in real wages. 
The FCM of Martin and Rogers (1995) breaks this circularity because even when capital is mobile, the distribution 
across regions of operative profits is constant. 
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As shown in Figure 11, the simulations show that in the four cases, the larger the value these 
parameters take, the more likely an increase in the share of transfers received by a region would 
result in an increase in its share of manufacturing firms. The intuition behind these results is very 
straightforward. The first result that emerges for the different parameter configurations in the 
simulations reported in Figure 11 is that as the share of transfers region i (ei) receives increases, the 
larger its participation in the country income given by the parameter i. Then, how this extra income 
is expended will have different effects on the location of manufacturing production. Let us now 
look at the intuition behind each of the four different cases: 
a. A larger elasticity of substitution means that consumers care less about the number of 
manufactures varieties so they tend to consume more of domestically produced varieties in 
order to save on transportation costs. So, as the share of transfers (ei) region i receives increases, 
the extra income is mostly expended in locally produced varieties, increasing the rate of return 
of local firms and attracting those located elsewhere. 
b. The intuition is relatively similar in the case of M, the share of income expended in 
manufactures instead of the non-trade good. In this case, the larger M is, the larger is the share 
of income coming from transfers that is expended in manufacturing goods than in the non-
traded good. Once again, the increasing demand for manufactures in the region which is 
benefited from the increase in transfers raises the return to capital attracting firms from the other 
region.  
c. With respect to the first of the policy choice parameters, transactions costs (), the larger these 
are the more consumers tend to consume domestically produced varieties in order to save on 
transaction costs. So, as a region income increases because of the increase in transfers it 
receives, the larger demand for varieties produced locally increases profits of local firms 
attracting those located in the other region. 
d. Finally, we have the case of the  parameter, the share of transfers going directly to consumers 
instead of local governments. In one extreme, when  is equal to zero, transfers from the Federal 
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government increases the consumption of manufactures only indirectly, trough the wages paid 
by the local government with the transfers it receives. However, as  becomes positive, part of 
these transfers, those received directly by consumers, go directly to the consumption of 
manufactures, as well as also indirectly whilst  < 1, such that the demand effect is larger in this 
second case, making more profitable to firms to relocate to the region which benefits from 
higher transfers.  
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
At the international level there is still an open debate on the role of transfers on economic growth 
and development. From the theoretical discussion about the transfer paradox to the empirical 
evidence, it appears to be no conclusive answer. At the sub-national level, the evidence is scarcer, 
with most of the analysis focusing on the political economy of transfers than on their economic 
impact, in particular in the regional shaping of production. The causal evidence presented in section 
3 shows that, a priori, there not exist a clear correlation between transfers and location of footloose 
activities. This presumption is confirmed using a relatively simple model inspired on the New 
Economic Geography. As it is shown in section 4, the final outcome depends on factors that are out 
of control of the public sector, i.e. consumer preferences, as well as other variables over which 
governments can influence on, such as to whom transfers are directed to and transaction costs. Thus, 
here also it becomes an empirical matter what relationship, if any, there exists between 
unconditional vertical transfers and the location of footloose activities. 
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Table 1. Data description and sources 
Country Variable Description Source Period 
Argentina 
Transfers Automatic transfers per capita (“Coparticipación”)  
Departamento de Economía, 
Universidad Nacional de La Plata 
1962-2001 
GDP Regional Gross Domestic Product per capita 
Australia 
Transfers Current grants and subsidies per capita to Australian Regions 
Australian Bureau of Statistics 2000-2010 
GDP Total manufacturing income per capita 
Brazil 
Transfers Automatic transfers per capita (“Fundo de participacao dos estados FPE”) Ministério de Fazenda – COPEM 
1995-2009 
GDP Gross value added of manufacturing sector at basic prices 
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografía e 
Estatística 
Canada 
Transfers Federal cash transfers per capita Canadian regions Department of Finance Canada 
1997-2008 
GDP Manufacturing gross domestic product per capita Statistics Canada 
Mexico 
Transfers Automatic transfers per capita (“Participaciones Federales”) 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística y 
Geografía (INEGI) 
1994-2010 
GDP Manufacturing Gross Domestic Product per capita 
Spain 
Transfers Shared taxes per capita (“Tributos cedidos”) 
Dirección General de Coordinación 
Financiera con las CCAA y las EELL 
1995-2009 
GDP Manufacturing Gross Domestic Product per capita Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas 
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Figure 1. Regional transfers and total GDP, 1962 and 2001: Argentina 
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Figure 2. Regional transfers and industry GDP, 1994 and 2010: Mexico 
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Figure 3. Regional transfers and industry GDP, 1995 and 2009: Brazil 
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Figure 4. Regional transfers and industry GDP, 1995 and 2009: Spain 
 
 
Note: transfers data for Navarra (NA) and País Vasco (PV) are not available 
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Figure 5. Regional transfers and industry GDP, 2000 and 2010: Australia 
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Figure 6. Regional transfers and industry GDP, 1999 and 2008: Canada 
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Table 2. -convergence (cross-section) 
     , 0 ,, , 0 , , 0ln i t i ti t t i t tGDPpc GDPpc TRpc e         
 ARG AUS BRA CAN MEX SPA 
 -0.0073** 0.0189** -0.0161** -0.0186** -1.0027 -0.0039 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.809) (0.008) 
 -0.0013 -0.8210* 1.8392* 0.3134 -5.5070 0.0438 
 (0.060) (0.342) (1.021) (0.501) (13.334) (0.128) 
Observations 23 8 27 13 32 14 
R-squared 0.128 0.626 0.348 0.428 0.120 0.082 
Period 1962-2001 2000-2010 1995-2009 1999-2008 1994-2010 1995-2009 
The dependent variable is the average of annual growth rates of regional (provincial) 
manufacturing GDP per capita for all cases but for Argentina. All monetary values were at 2001 
constant prices. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3. -convergence (panel-data) 
     , 1 ,, , 1 , , 1ln i t t i i ti t t i t tGDPpc GDPpc TRpc e              
 ARG AUS BRA CAN MEX SPA 
 -3.7e-06** -9.4e-05* -2.8e-04*** -1.1e-06 -4.6e-05*** -1.8e-05* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 0.0167** 0.0910 2.3414** 0.1064* 4.0508 -0.0003 
 (0.008) (0.430) (1.087) (0.060) (4.572) (0.005) 
Observations 895 80 378 117 512 196 
R-squared 0.249 0.441 0.186 0.329 0.100 0.871 
N° Cross-sections 23 8 27 13 32 14 
Period 1962-2001 2000-2010 1995-2009 1999-2008 1994-2010 1995-2009 
All regression include time and cross-section fixed effects. The dependent variable is the annual growth rates 
of regional (provincial) manufacturing GDP per capita for all cases but for Argentina. All monetary values 
were at 2001 constant prices. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Figure 8 
Region i’s share in manufacturing firms and the distribution of transfers  
(Li=Lj=0.5, =1.05; =10, M=0.25, A=0.55, NT=0.2, =0, w=1) 
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Figure 9 
Region i’s shares in manufacturing firms and the distribution of transfers 
(Li=Lj=0.5, =1.05; =10, M=0.25, A=0.55, NT=0.20, w=1) 
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Figure 10 
Rate of capital relocation and distribution of transfers between  
consumers and local governments () 
(Li=Lj=0.5, =1.05; =10, M=0.25, A=0.55, NT=0.2, w=1) 
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Figure 11 
Share of Region i in the number of manufacturing firms  
(M=0.8; Li=Lj=0.5; K=1; =2; =0.5; wi=1) 
 
(=2.5; Li=Lj=0.5; K=1; =2; =0.95; wi=1) 
 
(M=0.8; Li=Lj=0.5; K=1; =0; =2.5; wi=1) 
 
(M=0.8; Li=Lj=0.5; K=1; =2; =5; wi=1) 
 
 
 
